On the evening of November 14, 1990, Alitalia Flight 404, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32 registered as I-ATJA, departed Milan-Linate Airport in Italy on a short-haul route to Zurich, Switzerland. The aircraft, a narrow-body twinjet assembled in 1974, was carrying Commander Raffaele Liberti and First Officer Massimo De Fraia, along with four cabin crew and 40 passengers, for a total of 46 people on board. This was the crew's third mission of the day, following round-trip flights between Milan and Frankfurt. The aircraft had been experiencing technical difficulties since the morning, specifically with its navigation receivers during Category II approach procedures, leading to a recommendation that the crew perform a simulated Category II approach upon arrival in Zurich to maintain certification for low-visibility operations.
At approximately 19:36 local time (18:36 UTC), Flight 404 took off from runway 36R at Linate. During the ascent to its cruising altitude of 20,000 feet, Commander Liberti complained about losing his flashlight, noting its high cost, while De Fraia laughed. As the aircraft reached its cruise altitude at 19:45, preparations for the approach to Zurich began. The initial plan involved a visual circuit to align with runway 28, but Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) broadcasts indicated that arrivals were being handled via runway 14. Consequently, the crew prepared for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 14. During these preparations, discrepancies arose between the navigation charts consulted by the two pilots; De Fraia was referencing charts for runway 16, while Liberti expected runway 28, though they proceeded with the understanding that they were approaching runway 14.
At 20:00, with visibility in Zurich reported at around 10 kilometers with mist and clouds, the crew discussed the simulated Category II approach required for maintenance checks. They realized they had been looking at different runway charts, a discrepancy they quickly dismissed. As the DC-9 descended southwest of Zurich, Liberti expressed concern that the aircraft was too fast and advised De Fraia to reduce speed further, citing the risk of being forced to abort if they approached too closely behind another aircraft. At 20:06, Zurich Approach Control authorized Flight 404 to descend to 4,000 feet, turn right on heading 110, and begin the ILS approach. However, Liberti incorrectly read back the heading as 110 instead of 110, but due to the numerical similarity, the controller did not correct him, though this may have contributed to later confusion regarding their position relative to the glideslope intercept point.
The critical sequence of events began at 20:07. The aircraft was descending towards the outer marker, a reference point located approximately 3.8 nautical miles (7 km) from the runway threshold, where the altimeter should have read around 1,250 feet. However, by 20:09, when the aircraft passed over the outer marker, it was at approximately 1,600 feet, significantly higher than expected, yet the pilots did not immediately correlate this discrepancy with their descent profile. Instead, at 20:08, the autopilot had captured what it believed to be the glideslope. Unbeknownst to the crew, Navigation Receiver Number 1 was providing false data, displaying a centered glideslope needle despite the aircraft being significantly below the actual path. To resolve earlier discrepancies between instruments, the crew selected RADIO 1, which routed all navigation displays through the single faulty receiver. This eliminated comparative redundancy and created a unified but false presentation of being on course.
The aircraft continued its descent, now following the false glideslope provided by the malfunctioning receiver. By 20:10, Flight 404 was at 1,100 feet, still about eight nautical miles from the runway, far too low for its distance. De Fraia began to express doubt, asking if they had missed the outer marker. Liberti checked the Distance Measuring Equipment (DME), which showed seven nautical miles to the runway, confirming they were still far away but unaware of how dangerously low they had become. At 20:10:57, realizing the situation was abnormal, Liberti ordered De Fraia to pull up. De Fraia initiated a go-around (rejected landing) procedure, increasing thrust and pitching the nose up. However, within seconds, Liberti yelled 'No!' and ordered De Fraia to grab the glideslope instead. De Fraia obeyed, disconnecting the go-around and returning to a descent.
The decision to terminate the go-around proved fatal. Almost immediately after resuming descent, the radio altimeter warning sounded, indicating the terrain was only 200 feet below. The aircraft was approaching the Stadlerberg, a wooded hill rising to 637 meters, which had no obstacle lighting and was obscured by clouds. At 20:11, the DC-9 impacted the trees on the northern slope of the Stadlerberg at an altitude of approximately 1,660 feet. The impact destroyed the right wing, caused the aircraft to roll violently, and led to a catastrophic crash and fire. All 46 people on board perished instantly.
The official investigation by the Swiss Commission for Air Accident Investigation (AAIB), with Italian and US participation, determined the cause to be a Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) resulting from a combination of technical failure and human error. The primary technical factor was a design flaw in the King KNR 6030 navigation receiver used on the DC-9. This specific model could fail silently, displaying a centered glideslope needle when no signal was received, without triggering a red warning flag. The crew had lost visual reference to the ground due to darkness and cloud cover, relying entirely on instruments that were providing consistent but incorrect data.
Human factors played a critical role in the accident. The investigation highlighted a breakdown in Crew Resource Management (CRM). Commander Liberti exhibited an authoritarian style, often speaking to De Fraia like an instructor rather than a equal partner in the cockpit. When discrepancies appeared or doubts arose, the crew failed to cross-check their instruments against the approach chart’s expected altitudes and distances effectively. Furthermore, both pilots relied on old 'drum pointer' altimeters, which were prone to misreading by up to 1,000 feet if not carefully observed. NASA studies cited in the report indicated that a significant percentage of pilots had misread these instruments. It is likely that Liberti misinterpreted his altitude in the final moments, believing they were at 1,300 feet when they were actually near 300 feet, which may have influenced his decision to abort the go-around, thinking they could simply recover the glideslope.
Systemic and procedural failures also contributed. The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) on the aircraft, a Sundstrand Mark II, did not sound the 'too low glideslope' alert (Mode 5) because it was receiving the same erroneous navigation data as the main instruments, or possibly due to its own malfunction. Additionally, air traffic control in Zurich failed to monitor the aircraft's altitude strictly after authorization. The controller assumed that because the aircraft was aligned with the runway, it was on the correct path, and did not intervene when Flight 404 descended below its cleared altitude of 4,000 feet prematurely. This lack of radar surveillance intervention was noted as a missed opportunity, especially compared to similar instructions given to other aircraft simultaneously.
In the aftermath of the crash, significant changes were implemented globally. The Swiss authorities mandated stricter ATC procedures requiring controllers to monitor aircraft altitudes until crew confirmation of being established on approach. Alitalia updated its manuals and training to emphasize the dangers of specific navigation receiver failures and the importance of completing a go-around once started. Internationally, the necessity of having independent monitoring for navigation signals and the replacement of unreliable altimeter types were emphasized. The accident underscored the critical need for effective CRM, where junior officers feel empowered to challenge decisions, and highlighted that safety relies on multiple independent barriers; when these are compromised by design flaws, miscommunication, and procedural lapses, catastrophe can occur even in routine operations.
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