French officials and analysts discuss why France has not mounted reciprocal information operations against Russia despite persistent accusations of Russian interference in French politics since the war in Ukraine began in February 2022. [1]
Jean de Gliniasty, former French ambassador to Russia and researcher at IRIS, argues that Russians aim to signal presence and ability to annoy, while French culture favors secrecy over open disinformation campaigns. [1]
He notes that French unconditional support for Ukraine makes France seem at war with Russia in Russian thinking, and that Russian patriotism enables President Vladimir Putin to mobilize society, even though his electoral base may be around 50 percent. [1]
Olivier Mas, former DGSE senior official, says France dislikes using bots and manipulating information, recalling a rejected U.S. proposal for an international information channel, while acknowledging France could rely on true stories and maintains ready scenarios at DGSE. [1]
In cyber domains, Mas cites potential options such as striking bot farms or tampering with public water distribution networks, stressing calibration to avoid loss of control of malware and to avoid civilian deaths such as plane or train accidents. [1]
He emphasizes staying within hybrid warfare, avoiding open military strikes inside Russia, and points to France's DGSE Action service capable of clandestine military actions, often without explicit attribution. [1]
Mas describes French doctrine as never declaring itself, contrasting with Russian practice of striking without claiming responsibility, and notes France can choose signatures, such as using non-French weapons to mask involvement or distinctive tools to signal capability. [1]
Jean de Gliniasty identifies human rights NGOs, rule of law and environmental groups funded by Western actors as France's most potent counter-pressure on Moscow, resonating more with Russians than overt operations. [1]
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